1 The authors associated with the modal theory express varying degrees of commitment to this approach, but they all do present a modal-like analysis. Another issue to keep in mind is that the so-called modal element proposed may differ more or less from regular modals, and at some point we might better call this the "modaloid" theory, a less attractive term to be sure, but perhaps appropriately so.
If you want to treat the imperative modal as a dynamic modal, similarly to the treatment of epistemic modals in Groenendijk et al. (1996) and the treatment of expressions of expectation in Veltman (1996) , I'd consider that an implementation of the dynamic theory. See van Rooij (2008) and Portner (2009) for discussion of how this might be done. The adherents of what I call the "modal theory" assume that the modal in question falls under a standard (static) analysis of modals, such as Kratzer's. we call it a free choice sentence. As is well-known, free choice sentences can be made with disjunction or an indefinite (including special indefinites like any). Closely related is Ross's paradox. I lump all this together under the label "choice phenomena". A key testing ground for analyses of permission imperatives will be how well they fit into our understanding of choice phenomena.
(2) (a) You may take an apple or an orange.
(b) Take a/any piece of fruit! Three recent approaches to free choice in modal sentences:
Traditional assumptions
Choice phenomena come about on the basis of fairly traditional semantic values and Gricean reasoning (Aloni and van Rooij 2004, Schulz 2005 ).
Alternatives
Choice phenomena come about because the semantics introduces each alternative separately, one way (Zimmermann 2000 , Geurts 2005 or another (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 , Simons 2005 , Menéndez-Benito 2005 , Alonso-Ovalle 2006 , Aloni 2007 ).
Ordering and update
Choice phenomena come about because of the dynamic semantics associated with particular elements, in particular deontic may (van Rooij 2008).
We also have a divide between those who think that free choice with disjunction is a conversational implicature (Kratzer and Shimoyama, Menendez-Benito, Alonso-Ovalle, Aloni and van Rooij, Schulz) , a matter of truth conditions (Geurts, Simons, Aloni) , or something else (van Rooij). The implicature side does better with the interpretation of FC indefinites and disjunction in negative environments, (3) .
(3) Nobody should eat an apple or an orange.
Chemla (2009) has recently pointed out problems for the implicature account.
Main claims for today's talk 1. The dynamic theory of imperatives handles permission in a very simple way.
2. In combination with the "alternatives" approach to disjunction/indefinites, this treatment of permission imperatives immediately accounts for choice phenomena.
3. The explanation can be immediately extended to choice phenomena with performative modals. Purely descriptive (non-performative) modals deserve to be distinguished from performative ones more carefully than they have been in the past.
Background on the dynamic semantics of imperatives
Assertion is commonly analyzed in terms of Stalnaker's concept of common ground (Stalnaker 1974 (Stalnaker , 1978 . Parallel to this, asking a question has been analyzed in terms of a second discourse component, what Ginzburg calls the 'Question Under Discussion Stack' (Ginzburg 1995a; 1995b , Roberts 1996 . Portner (2004) proposes that imperatives are interpreted as contributing to the addressee's To-Do List:
(4) Pragmatic function of imperatives (ver. 1) a. The To-Do List function T assigns to each participant α in the conversation a set of properties T (α).
Where C is a context of the form CG, Q, T :
The To-do List is similar to ideas in Lewis (1979) , Han (1998) , Roberts (2004) , and Mastop (2005) . What's different is the Ordering pragmatics for imperatives. In particular, the To-Do List functions to impose an ordering on the worlds compatible with the Common Ground, and this ordering determines what actions an agent is committed to taking (Portner 2004 ):
(5) Ordering pragmatics for imperatives (a) Partial ordering of worlds: For any w  , w  ∈ ∩CG and any participant i, w  < i w  iff for some P ∈ T (i), P (w  )(i) =  and P (w  )(i) = , and for all
For any participant i, the participants in the conversation mutually agree to deem i's actions rational and cooperative to the extent that those actions in any world w  ∈ CG tend to make it more likely that there is no w  ∈ CG such that w  < i w  .
The Common Ground and To-do List are parallel at the discourse level to the modal base and ordering source in the sentential semantics of modals.
Portner (2007) points out that the range of pragmatic functions displayed by imperatives is parallel to the readings of priority modals (that is, non epistemic, non-dynamic modals): b. You should imagine all the people living for today, given that it will help the world be as one.
The differences among the (b) sentences involve the choice of ordering source (Kratzer 1981) . Portner (2007) analyzes the differences among the (a) sentences as involving different subsets to the addressee's To-do List. For example, an imperative expresses an order when it motivates an addition the To-do List on the basis of the speaker's authority. There are pragmatic links between ordering sources and subsets of the To-do List.
The question for today is how permission interpretations of imperatives fit into this picture. Unfortunately, the literature has neglected the tasks of defining permission and of providing criteria for identifying which sentences give permission. I think that most scholars would classify the invitation in (7a) as a permission imperative; Portner (2004) analyzes invitation as adding a property to the addressee's To-do List on the grounds that it will lead to the better satisfaction of her desires. Because these are the grounds, the addressee can freely accept or reject the imperative (Thanks/No thanks); thus the effect of the imperative is permission. Note that imperative variants that emphasize the speaker's authority or power disallow this type of permission usage (see Potsdam 1996 and Portner 2007 on the effect of an overt you subject):
(9) (a) You eat an apple! / Don't you eat an apple! (b) Let him eat an apple! Portner (2007) suggests that permission in a stricter sense can be described as like invitation, with the additional presupposition that the speaker has the authority to prohibit the act in question. Examples of this, inspired by Lewis, would be the following: 
The pragmatics of permission
The above account treats permission imperatives as adding a requirement to the To-do List. They differ from strong imperatives like commands only in the grounds which support the requirement. There is a common intuition, however, that permissions are weaker than commands in their conventional meaning, in the same way that possibility modals are weaker than necessity modals.
The problem about permission Lewis (1979) proposes a model of commands for a language game involving three players, the Master, the Slave, and the Kibitzer. The key formal idea is the Sphere of Permissibility: the Slave is responsible for making sure that the actual world remains a member of the Sphere. When the Master utters a sentence of the form !φ, the Sphere is changed as in follows (I'm simplifying Lewis's theory here):
(11) When the Master utters !φ, the Sphere of Permissibility S becomes S ∩ φ.
The problem about permission is that a similar, initially plausible principle, (12), does not work for permission:
(12) When the Master utters ¡φ, the Sphere of Permissibility S becomes S ∪ φ.
(12) implies that any world in which φ is true is in the Sphere. Thus, in the case of (10a), the Slave would be entitled to drink the Master's wine, or kill he Master, or take the rest of the week off, provided he takes tomorrow off.
Lewis himself suggests, and rejects, several solutions, among them one taken up and developed by van Rooij (2000) . The idea is that at any point in time, we have not just a Sphere S, but an ordering which reflects the relative reprehensibility of worlds not in S. Lewis rejects this solution because he has no way of defining the ordering, in particular no way of explaining how it evolves through time. Van Rooij points out that if we replace S with something that determines both an ordering and a Sphere, we should be able to define how a series of utterances affect both things. What I will show next is that, because the To-do List determines an ordering, it allows us to formalize this solution in a simple way.
Permission in the dynamic theory Kamp (1979) points out that permission only occurs in the context of a countervailing prohibition:
What enables me to extend a permission to Michael is a certain authority I have over him. This relation of authority is characterized by a variety of standing prohibitions -things which Michael is not supposed to do -not at least unless I tell him. It is only with reference to these prohibitions that my permission statement can fulfill the function it has: to remove some of these prohibitions from the list -for a short while, or, sometimes, for good. Thus a permission statement, when it is successful, moves a certain class of actions from the realm of the prohibited into that of the permitted. (p. 62) (I don't agree with the clause "to remove some of these prohibitions from the list", but with the rest I do.)
Let us begin with the following example:
(13) Monday carry rocks! Tuesday carry rocks! And Wednesday carry rocks! [. . . Tuesday comes along] Take tomorrow off! After the first three imperatives are uttered, the Slave's To-do List becomes {¬K(x,m), C(x, mo), C(x, tu), C(x, we)}. 2 This To-do List implies that the Slave must not kill the Master (not explicitly stated, but surely assumed) and must carry rocks each of the three days.
(Have a look at Figure 1 .) Then on Tuesday, the Master gives permission to take Wednesday off. Thus, the To-do List becomes {¬K(x, m), C(x, mo), C(x, tu), C(x, we), ¬C(x, we)}. This To-do List is inconsistent.
Figure 1: The choices on Wednesday
Given (5), it implies that the Slave does as well as he can: he either carries rocks Wednesday, or he doesn't.
Either way, he can make four of the five propositions in the To-do List true. (More accurately, after having worked Monday and Tuesday, and not killing the Master, either working on Wednesday or taking the day off makes it the case that there is no better-ranked world.) Crucially, killing the Master is still not an option. Intuitively, the inconsistency of the To-do List represents the fact that carrying rocks on Wednesday off was formerly required, but is no longer required. The ordering semantics captures the fact that when an imperative conflicts with an existing requirement, the result is permission, not (typically) a new contrary requirement.
Example (10a) poses a problem. It seems that after the first imperative is uttered, the To-do List should be
Adding ¬C(x, we) to this set leads to a situation where never working again is permitted. The problem is that once the Slave takes Wednesday off, ∀d [C(x, d) ] is false, and no amount of work can make it true again. Skipping one day is no better than skipping many.
The solution to this problem is to expand the To-do List from
, C(x, mo), C(x, tu), C(x, we), C(x, th), C(x, f r)}. There might be interesting ways to implement this, for example by giving the quantifier scope over a force operator. But I prefer an uninteresting way: the Slave knows that he is to work on Monday, on Tuesday, on Wednesday, etc. So the To-do List is expanded by inference. Once ¬C(x, we) is added to this set, we represent permission to take Wednesday off (or not), but still require work on the other days. Note that this solution is essentially the one Kratzer (1977) applies to the pros and cons of striding and flying; van Rooij (2000) draws on "relevant entailments" for a similar purpose.
Definitions of permission and requirement
In Figure 1 , we can say that ¬C(x, we) is permitted, because some best-ranked worlds are ones in which ¬C(x, we) is satisfied. 
Take tomorrow off ! in (13) is a permission sentence.
We can say ¬K(x, m) is required, because all best-ranked worlds are ones in which ¬K(x, m) is satisfied. 
These descriptions make the limit assumption, for simplicity. A more precise and general version of (14) would say that [[ S ] ] is a good possibility, with respect to CG and T (addressee), in the terms of Kratzer (1981 Kratzer ( , 1991 . Likewise, (15) would say that [[ S ] ] is a weak necessity, with respect to CG and T (addressee). This way of thinking about things lets us consider status of propositions which meet the criteria for other grades of modality in Kratzer's system. For example, a (simple) possibility would describe a situation where S-worlds and ¬S-worlds alternate endlessly in the ordering, as in a case where there's too much uncertainty concerning the effects of one's actions. According to (5), an agent doesn't have the right to pursue a possibility which is not a good possibility. (If you think that this is wrong, and that an agent can rationally and cooperatively pursue a simple possibility, the prediction can easily be changed by modifying (5b).) These points exemplify nicely how the theory of modality can be brought to bear within the dynamic approach to imperatives, even though no modal is syntactically present.
Disjunction and Choice
Given this analysis of permission, we can also give an explanation of free choice disjunction in imperatives and of Ross's paradox:
(16) Take an apple or a pear! (17) a. Take an apple! b. Take an apple or a pear! In (16), it's ok to take an apple, and it's ok to take a pear; it's probably not ok to take both. In (17), (b) does not follow from (a), in some sense. I follow the alternatives camp, most specifically Alonso-Ovalle (2008), in analyzing disjunction as creating alternatives within a Hamblin semantics. Thus (16) denotes the set:
Along with the rest of the "alternatives" camp, I assume a process of "exclusification", so that T (x, a) is understood as T (x, a) ∧ ¬T (x, p).
The rule specifying the discourse function of imperatives should be modified to allow for the denotation to contain multiple members:
(19) Pragmatic function of imperatives (ver.
2) The canonical discourse function of an imperative clause φ imp is to add every member of [[ φ imp ]] to T (addressee). Where C is a context of the form CG, Q, T :
An utterance of (16) results in an inconsistent To-do List which gives the (minimal) ordering of worlds illustrated in Figure 2 . In this setting, the addressee will behave correctly by taking either an apple or a pear. (Of course if ¬K(x, host) is already on the To-do List, none of this will permit killing the host, but
T(x,a),¬T(x,p)
¬T(x,a),T(x,p) In many contexts, it will be ok to take neither an apple nor a pear. A natural situation of this kind occurs when the imperative is designed to overcome the politness-based reluctance of addressee to impose on the speaker (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1988) . That is, we assume an initial To-do List {¬T (x, a) ∧ ¬T (x, p)}. In this context, (16) leads to the To-do List {T (x, a) ∧ ¬T (x, p), ¬T (x, a) ∧ ¬T (x, p), ¬T (x, a) ∧ T (x, p)} and to the order in Figure 3 .
¬T(x,a), ¬T(x,p) T(x,a),¬T(x,p)
¬T(x,a),T(x,p)
Figure 3: All three choices ok
Intuitively, the solution to Ross's paradox comes from the observation that a master who says (17a) would not necessarily endorse (17b), since the latter would permit an action not permitted by the former. But a master who says (17b) would have no problem endorsing (17a). We want to say that an imperative φ warrants another imperative ψ iff adding the latter to a To-do List which already contains the former never changes the order:
(20) For any imperative sentences φ, ψ: φ warrants ψ = def for every context c, c+φ = (c+φ)+ψ.
For example, (17b) warrants (17a), but not vice versa. Warrant is Kamp's (1979) notion of p-entailment, a concept also important for van Rooij (2008) . I use the term "warrant", because as pointed out by, for example, Segerberg (1990) , "entailment" is confusing, given that (17a) entails (17b) in terms of satisfaction.
Indefinites and choice
Free choice imperatives with indefinites work the same way as those with disjunction: Figure 4 gives the ordering, with choices taken to be exclusive. (This is some kind of trick where the addressee can see the cards' faces.)
P(x,6♠) Lack of time precludes me from getting into the complexities of indefinites in detail. I would note that van Rooij's (2008) analysis of any in imperatives should transfer over, given that it is based on warrant (i.e., p-entailment).
Comments on modals
Performative modals fit easily into the analysis developed so far. Descriptive modals will require separate discussion.
Performative modals
Performative modals are those which, by virtue of their conventional meaning, determine a speech act for sentences they are contained in other than, or in addition to, that associated with the sentence's clause type (Portner 2009 ).
It is often assumed that some deontic modals are performative (e.g., Kamp 1973 , Lyons 1977 , Ninan 2005 , van Rooij 2008 , Portner 2009 , where the performativity is manifest as an imperative-like speech act.
(22) You must sit down.
(Actually performativity shows up with all priority modals.) Some of the literature on choice phenomena focuses on performative deontic modals, suggesting that authors consider them to represent the core case (e.g., Kamp 1973 , van Rooij 2008 .
Epistemic modals can be performative as well (Lyons 1977 , Swanson 2006a ,b, von Fintel and Gillies 2007 , Yalcin 2007a ,b, Portner 2008 , among others):
(23) It must be raining.
With epistemics, we find disagreement about the nature of the performativity; see Portner (2009) for discussion. I find Swanson's description that they "raise possibilities" to be intuitive.
Performative modals robustly give rise to choice phenomena:
(24) (a) You must sit or lie down. (26) (a) Added to addressee's To-do List:
Following Portner (2007), we can assume that the addressee's To-do List is likely to be a subset of the ordering source for this sentence and subsequent sentences expressing the same kind of modality. Given this, and point (26a), (24a) guarantees the truth of both (27a-b), and it warrants both (28a-b), understood as permissions: 
Performative epistemic modals
Portner (2008, 2009 ) suggest that we model the performativity of epistemic modals in terms of the Common propositional space. The CPS is the set of propositions which the participants in a conversation mutually understand to be candidates for inclusion in the common ground. Some epistemic modals add their prejacent to the CPS; this amounts to "raising a possibility" (Swanson 2006a,b) , or "proffering" (von Fintel and Gillies 2007) a proposition. The analysis of (25a) is as follows:
Because the propositions in the CPS are candidates for inclusion in the common ground, they must each be compatible with the common ground. Thus, (25a) guarantees the truth of both (30a-b):
(30) (a) It may be raining.
(b) It may be snowing.
Descriptive modals
I haven't noticed any research which systematically compares different classes of modals in terms of whether they manifest choice phenomena. Authors either focus on specific modal elements, without detailed comment on the others (e.g., van Rooij 2008), or assume (apparently) that all classes of modals behave alike (e.g., Alonso-Ovalle 2006 , Aloni 2007 . Let me begin with some initial observations which suggest that the situation is somewhat complex.
1. Dynamic modals do not always give rise to choice phenomena. Within this class, it seems that opportunity modals are more likely to lack choice readings than ability modals; sometimes quantificational modals show choice readings, and sometimes they are quite odd in the relevant structure:
(31) (a) At the top of the mountain, you can find snow or ice to make drinking water. 2. Quantified sentences often lack choice readings, even with deontic modals, provided they aren't performative.
(36) #Take an apple or a pear! -but I don't know which.
This fact seems difficult to account for under a theory which assumes (i) that imperatives are modal sentences, and (ii) that choice phenomena have nothing to do with performativity.
Much more empirical work will be needed to make the patterns clear, but I think what we see so far validates the assumption (seemingly made by Kamp 1973 and van Rooij 2008, for example) that performativity is at the heart of choice phenomena. It also suggests that a different kind of account is right for the descriptive modals. As for what that account could be, there are several options. The simplest route would be to adopt one of the existing implicature-based analysis mentioned in the introduction. However, given the findings of suggesting that the free choice effect is not conversational implicature, it's worthwhile to consider another alternative, which I outline here briefly.
Are descriptive modals mildly performative?
The performative modals discussed in Section 6.1 add their prejacent to a primary component of the discourse, for example someone's To-do List; the fact that all alternatives are added is what explains choice phenomena. Moreover, the same component of the discourse serves as their ordering source, and in this way they make themselves true.
We can get a similar effect with descriptive modals by establishing a conditional relation between their prejacent and the conversational background which serves as their ordering source. For example, suppose we have the following defeasible conversational principle:
(37) Enrich the conversational background Given context C, modal base f , and ordering source g: if M(φ) is accepted in C for addition to the common ground, then g is updated to
The idea is that, in general, when you find out that something is necessary or possible on the basis of the ordinary meaning of a modal, your update the conversational background which served as the ordering source for that modal so as to directly record that it is necessary or possible. This way, it's readily available as a premise the next time you use the same conversational background. (If M is a possibility modal, implicature may also get you {¬p :
We saw in (31)-(35) that the principle (37) sometimes fails. Here are my intuitions about why it fails: In (31a), the possibility is transient; in (32) , it contains a free variable; in (33), its description was "off the rack", and not tailored for the particular modal assertion which was made; and in (35), there are two possibilities, and the speaker signals that he won't guarantee the correctness of either of them. I don't know about (31c).
On this view, choice effects have a similar origin with performative and descriptive modals. In a way, it says that all modals have the potential for a kind of performativity, though sometimes the performativity is of a mild variety which only affects the interpretation of other modals, by modifying a conversational background. However, I would tend to think that (37) is the result of a general cognitive principle, not a strictly linguistic one, much less one grammatically tied to particular morphemes. If that's the case, it's not properly speaking performativity.
Bullet points about other approaches
Many other scholars have worked on various aspects of the issues discussed above, but unfortunately time won't permit a detailed comparison with their work.
(38) Zimmermann (2000) and Geurts (2005) • Geurts' version: no clear connection to performativity. (Zimmermann's version has the Authority Principle, which is indirectly connected to performativity with deontics.)
• No analysis of imperatives.
• Wrongly predicts that choice readings occur in DE contexts (Alonso-Ovalle 2006).
• Wrongly predicts that choice phenomena always occur in quantified sentences and under ellipsis. No clear predictions concerning dynamic modals.
(39) Kratzer and students (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 , Menéndez-Benito 2005 , Alonso-Ovalle 2006 • Similar to the present account of descriptive modals.
• No connection to performativity.
• Wrongly predicts that choice phenomena occur with opportunity modals.
• Difficult to distinguish descriptive from performative modals in ellipsis case: If a reason for implicature cancellation can be found in (33), it's unclear why (34) should be different.
(40) Aloni (2007) • Provides an account of licensing of any.
• Assumes "modaloid" theory of imperatives; imperative operator is a mix of a and a 3.
• Wrongly predicts that any is not licensed in imperatives.
• No account of permission imperatives.
• Wrongly predicts that choice phenomena occur with opportunity modals, in quantified sentences, and under ellipsis, as robustly as with performative modals.
• Wrongly predicts that I don't know which can work in imperatives.
(41) van Rooij (2000 Rooij ( , 2008 • Many similarities to the present account.
• Intrinsic connection to performativity.
• Focuses on imperatives and performative deontic may. No predictions about other modals or other contexts.
• Provides an account of licensing of any, building on p-entailment.
• Assumes modal theory of imperatives.
• Wrongly predicts that any is not licensed in strong imperatives.
• Problems with the analysis of performativity:
-The analysis depends on a premise set Ψ which determines an ordering, but it's never stated what Ψ is supposed to be. (I would have thought it concerns the reprehensibility ordering, parallel to (5), but he suggests not.) -Assumes that, when M ay(p ∨ q) is interpreted, both p and q are already in Ψ. But what justifies this assumption? (I would have thought that the performativity of the sentence itself takes care of this, as in (19).) -Does not assume a Hamblin semantics for disjunction, making it difficult to ensure formally that p and q are each in Ψ.
